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TWELVE MEDITATIONS ON VENTURE CAPITAL  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reflects on the policy formation process in the burgeoning area of venture capital 
finance. An important question is raised as to why so little extant academic research, of both rigor 
and relevance, is employed in policy formation. The authors argue that the long term, 
international and comparative perspective of the academic researcher is of increasing importance 
in government. The gap between policy practice and academic empiricism is illustrated by 
reference to contemporary policy interest in the creation of public/private (‘hybrid’) venture 
capital funds. The rubric of 12 Meditations is employed as a device to communicate across the 
academic/policy maker divide.  
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Meditation (definition) 
 
a. The action or practice of profound spiritual or religious reflection or mental contemplation.  
b. Continuous thought on one subject; (a period of) serious and sustained reflection or mental 
contemplation. 
 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2007) 
 
 
For practicing Buddhists, meditation is an important aid to self knowledge and enlightenment. In 
the context of this policy oriented paper, we use this concept in order to raise an important set of 
questions. Can organizations also become enlightened? Is it possible for a governmental or state 
agency to undertake ‘serious and sustained’ reflection? Put another way, can a public agency 
create, and subsequently employ effectively, a collective memory of past actions and 
consequences? We would suggest and will argue in this paper that, from the empirical evidence 
available, government organizations are often rather poor at learning from their own past 
experiences or borrowing from the relevant experiences of equivalent agencies in other countries.  
 
There are many reasons that may account for this partial and imperfect learning. Civil servants 
are specialists in the multifaceted and often highly politicized processes of government but not 
always in the mastery of specific content. Able public servants in national administrations in most 
advanced polities regularly move across the government machine taking disparate roles in several 
departments in their progress to senior office.1 Reflection also takes time and space in the agenda, 
                                                
1 The United States is a notable exception to this pattern. 
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two commodities very scarce in contemporary governments constrained by shrinking budgets and 
growing demands in an age of state decline (van Creveld, 1999). And, invariably, rational and 
depersonalized Weberian bureaucratic actions will always be overlaid, second guessed or 
trumped by the contemporary political imperative. 
 
It is in this policy context that we would argue that the professional academic ‘outsider’ may 
have a role. By definition, a scholarly analysis demands reflection, a theoretical compass, and a 
menu of appropriate methodologies. These are applied to situations which are often viewed over 
time and across different conceptual geographies in order to reach robust generalizable 
conclusions. The academic process is both comparative and evaluative. On occasions it may also 
be prescriptive. It is in offering this differently rigorous and more longitudinal perspective that 
the academic may complement the shorter run agendas of the policy practitioners. Indeed, in 
some circumstances, the specialist academic outsider may have a greater knowledge and 
understanding of historic policy actions and their consequences than the current cohort of 
responsible policy makers. 
 
We make the strong assumption of a different type of academic knowledge. In consequence, our 
objective in this paper is perhaps ambitious… even heroic. Namely, we wish to inform 
government policy makers of the consequences of their actions and to stress how well-grounded 
theory from economics, management, and entrepreneurship disciplines may usefully inform their 
policy choices. Specifically, and academics by definition should always be specific, we wish to 
illustrate our premise with reference to the Financial Services industry. We will argue how the 
applications of early-stage, venture capital (VC) financing policy by several governments - 
undertaken with little reference to this wider body of research - have often resulted in adverse 
consequences far removed from their original aspirations. We seek to give explanations as to why 
these divergences occur by reference to both observed practice and established theory. Our focus 
and illustrations are exclusively focused on ‘early-stage’ VC activity where government and 
private interests have come together to jointly finance ‘hybrid’ investment funds (OECD, 2004 
and 2008). Our deliberations are informed by over twenty person-years involvement in academic 
research and policy advice/ evaluation across a number of developed and developing economies. 
It is precisely because we are not practitioners that our analysis may have merit. 
 
Insert figure 1 here 
 
Importantly, the purpose of the paper is neither to criticize nor to indict the actions of policy 
makers or, indirectly, practitioners. Rather, the authors’ ambition is to raise a hand of caution and 
gently to request that aspiring policy makers reflect, however briefly, on the historical record of 
public/ private interventions in order that new initiatives may at least be measured against, and 
more importantly informed by, the template of past experience and its formal analytical 
interpretation. To borrow from a Buddhist koan (riddle), we urge our policy maker readers ‘to 
listen to the sound of a one-handed clap’. 
 
Our observations reflect on public/private co-investment arrangements in a specialist area of 
financial services involving the financial support of young, innovative and entrepreneurial firms. 
After the unprecedented chaos of global financial services starting in the Fall of 2008, which has 
lead to publicly funded rescues (i.e. equity purchases) of many of the Western worlds’ major 
financial services firms, we now find that the management of public/private partnerships in 
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financial services has become a current and multi-trillion dollar issue. The state has once again 
become a major player, perhaps the most important player, in global capital markets. The policy 
dimension of public and private concerted actions has become an issue of the utmost economic 
importance. Also we have heard several commentators, mirroring public bafflement, ask: why 
was it not possible to learn more from previous experience of financial and market failures?  
 
Academic Engagement – or why don’t they ever listen to us? 
 
The degree to which management scholars should or should not actively engage in advising or 
influencing policy or practitioner constituencies remains a permanent element of academic 
introspection and debate (Van de Ven, 2007). For many scholars, too close an association with 
the commercial or public activities of professional managers and their organizations is seen as 
engendering a risk of compromised intellectual freedom, objectivity and integrity. Jermier (1998) 
notes that applied managerial research is too often designed and focused on issues determined at 
the behest of the established, élite cohorts of top management and/or majority stock holders. By 
implication, the research goals may often be counter to the interests of labor, consumers, or the 
average citizen (a large and passive group increasingly termed Main Street). The direction of 
much of applied management research is seen as possibly laden with value assumptions inimical 
to the liberality of many social scientists. Management research may actually be damaging to 
workers’ interests. (It is therefore not surprising that John Doe rarely demands an academic 
opinion.). On occasion, academic advice may not be good for anyone. Ghoshal (2005), citing the 
disastrous governance failures of Enron, Tyco and Global Crossing, argued that some theoretical 
underpinnings of management thinking may actively condone bad management practice (or 
pathologies). He specifically examples the important, financial economics concept of ‘Principal- 
Agency theory’ with its explicit assumption of self interested and adversarial action as the norm 
of management behavior. Here, the need to incentivize management agents beyond other interest 
groups can be interpreted as an intellectual legitimization of the self-serving and destructive 
rapacity of top management teams. Merchant bankers please note!2 
 
For others, an academic career is more properly conducted in a reflective and disinterested 
environment removed from the ‘noise’ of the factory floor or executive suite. Here, the quality 
and relevance of academic endeavor is more properly determined by fellow academicians who 
judge output largely within the narrow and self referencing criteria of peer reviewed journal 
articles, research council grants, conference appearances and other indications of exclusively 
scholarly esteem and recognition. In each case, the contribution to and influencing of current 
behavior in the commercial or policy arenas is of subordinate interest and importance. 
Prescription is seen as the domain of the consultant. Despite consultancy being one of the largest 
employers of business and management school graduates, the term has a pejorative connotation 
to many academics. Consultancy advice is often excoriated by scholars as atheoretic, non 
rigorous and fashion driven, although there exists some recent evidence of a change in heart as 
so-called researcher/user ‘engagement’ assumes a greater academic salience (Van de Ven, 2007). 
 
If scholars’ ability and desire to influence commercial organizations is seen as limited, the impact 
of social sciences research on policy formation and execution is perhaps even more parlous. 
                                                
2 The draft was written before the announcement in December (2008 of the Bernard Madoff pyramid selling scandal 
at an alleged cost of $50 billion losses to investors in his funds. 
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Rynes and Shapiro (2005) lament that the accumulated knowledge of management and 
organizational behavior professors appears to have had negligible influence on the US 
government in its addressing of the major organizational and political challenges of the day. This 
belief of the general failure of theoretical and empirical scholarship to influence government’s 
perspective or actions is lamented by several other authors (Abrahamson and Eisenman, 2001; 
Bazerman, 2005, Pfeffer, 1998). Perhaps, the most obvious exception to this iron rule of 
irrelevance can be seen in the influential role that economists have played and continue to play in 
both commercial and public policy debates. This is despite the assertion by many critics of 
economics’ policy hegemony that economic theory has consistently proven to be systematically 
wrong (Bazerman, 2005:25). Where economists have appeared to be more consistently successful 
than other social scientists is in their engagement with both public and private practitioner 
constituencies, and in their ability to communicate using an institutionally accepted (if not widely 
understood) language and vocabulary (Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton, 2005). More critically, 
according to Bazerman (op. cit.), the influence of economists is founded on their ability and 
willingness to offer prescriptive advice and detailed analytical recommendation to practitioners. 
In so doing, economists have arguably communicated and worked with the subjects and users of 
their research in a more widely and deeply integrated manner that perhaps any other discipline in 
the social sciences.  
 
In the increasingly global, inter-related (and thus volatile) policy and commercial environments 
of the twenty first century, Abrahamson and Eisenman (2001) suggest that academics have to 
redefine themselves as knowledge entrepreneurs if they do not wish to see themselves as 
marginalized in what these authors believe is an increasingly commoditized knowledge market. 
This extreme interpretation would ironically seem to place academic researchers firmly in the 
domain of consultants similarly obliged to hustle in order to find research opportunities in a 
world of competing experts. We find this suggestion implausible if for no other reason than that 
much top quality academic research is not a commodity (unlike much consultancy) but is highly 
branded and personalized in both its form and delivery.3 However, the question of a sensible 
balance between the creation of intellectual value and its practical application remains. The 
policy actions of government are hugely material both in their direct and indirect impact on all 
citizens as well as in the considerable resources they consume. Academic researchers largely 
funded by public taxes cannot easily ignore either their actual cost or their potential contribution 
to society. Greater engagement with the policy process may well provide value to research 
producers and consumers alike. It is on this optimistic premise that this paper has been written.  
 
THE TWELVE MEDITATIONS 
 
The following twelve meditations are a personal reflection. They are both a summary and a 
critique of popular government actions in the field of entrepreneurial finance. In the area of early-
stage entrepreneurial finance, government activity is increasingly becoming the main driver of 
new forms of financial provision to start-up and young firms (Jääskeläinen, Maula and Murray, 
2007). Here an important clarification is necessary. In our examples and references, we are not 
describing a form of finance available and relevant to the great majority of small and medium 
                                                
3 Clearly, many large consultancies would also see themselves as branded providers of expert advice. However, the 
primary focus on the named individual producer and the subordination of the profit motive in mainstream academe to 
the public enhancement of knowledge makes the two activities profoundly different in practice. 
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sized enterprises (SMEs) that have few ambitions for growth. Rather, we are talking about forms 
of equity finance (i.e. risk capital) which are appropriate to that exceptional and small minority of 
new and young businesses, often termed Gazelles , that are very strongly growth focused (Acs et 
al., 2008; Autio, 2008). 
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
Each of the twelve meditations seeks to illuminate a particular area of public private activity and 
its related policy actions and consequences. They are presented as a set of statements that are 
testable, and thus potentially of academic credibility: 
 
1. Government Innovation & Finance policy makers fit into two camps. They either 
believe in Charles Darwin or the Book of Genesis. In reality, most prefer the Creation Story 
 
The state as Creationist  
 
In 1996, a report commissioned by the Industry R&D Board of the Australian Commonwealth 
government suggested that Australia should consider an ‘equity enhancement’ program (similar 
to that employed in the Small Business Investment Companies Act in the USA) in order to 
stimulate an increased investment of early-stage, risk capital into technology based young firms. 
The report’s author suggested that Australia had an hour glass problem (Murray, 1996a), i.e. a 
systemic constraint in the sources of start-up and early-stage growth finance available to high 
potential young firms. Within 18 months, the Australian Commonwealth government had created 
the Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) with an initial A$100 million budget. The IIF was designed 
specifically to address capital rationing in young firms by crafting a supply-side policy 
instrument which provided private VC funds with public leverage of up to 2:1 (Cumming, 2007). 
Australian policy makers and legislators acted with impressive speed to address a major concern 
of economic policy. The logic underpinning the creation of the IIF program was to remove a 
constriction in the capital market and thus assist the rapid development of an emerging, 
Australian venture capital industry (Wan, 1989). 
 
This enthusiasm to ‘kick start’ an Australian venture capital industry, while understandable, took 
little cognizance of the protracted period and the necessary environmental and institutional 
preconditions required to form a viable and profitable venture capital industry. American family 
trusts were doing proto-venture capital, equity financings in the 1930s (Gompers, 1994). The first 
‘classic’ VC firm, American Research and Development, incorporating a limited liability 
partnership legal structure was formed in the USA in 1946 by Professor Doriot (Hsu and Kenney, 
2005) aided by significant support from Harvard University. Yet, the US VC industry could only 
credibly be seen as an autonomous, and mature, asset class by the early 1980s – some forty years 
later (Avnimelech and Teubel, 2004). Similarly, the UK government employing the offices of the 
Bank of England created the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) and the 
Finance Corporation Industry (FCI) in 1945 as part of Britain’s post World War II reconstruction. 
These two organizations became the forerunner of 3i plc.4 The ICFC and the FCI were a policy 
response to the ‘equity gap’ first identified in Britain by the Macmillan Committee during the 
                                                
4 The name 3i – an acronym for Investors in Industry - was given to the merged organization formed from ICFC and 
FCI in 1983. 
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Great Depression and then reaffirmed by periodic official government reviews of the financial 
circumstances of small and medium-sized enterprise finance (Macmillan, 1931; Bolton, 1971; 
Wilson, 1979). Yet, the UK as the second largest VC industry in the world by the year 2000 was 
only a significant recipient and user of investment funds for early-stage risk capital investments 
from the mid 1990s onwards. While there is some evidence that the more recently established 
national VC industries in developed countries have taken  less time to become operational and 
professionalized – see for example the Finnish VC industry (Maula and Murray, 2003; 
Jääskeläinen, Maula and Murray, 2007) - the reality remains that the creation of a VC industry in 
even the most conducive legal, economic and technological environments is the product of 
decades of incremental and evolutionary change compatible with the wider commercial and 
political environments. 
 
Management scholars have long recognized the necessary precursors to effective strategic action 
at the level of the firm, industry or economy. Diffusion models, industry life cycles and stage 
theories of development, while often challenged (see for example, Rogers, 2003, Klepper, 1997), 
do acknowledge the time and cultural dimensions required for material change (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986; McDougall et al., 1994). Similarly, advocates of ‘resource based theories of the 
firm’ indirectly recognize that knowledge resources and particularly tacit competencies are not 
easily or speedily acquired (Kay, 1993). Above all, economic historians have counseled us as to 
the slow pace and long gestation of real industrial change (North, 2005, Clark, 2007). 
 
Yet, political imperatives demand rapid action with the creation of immediately (and preferably 
novel) policies and programs. Civil servants are often obliged to be complicit in such haste. 
Policy horizons do not easily extend beyond the interstices between elections in a democratic 
state which has now become the dominant form of political organization. Thus, publicly financed 
incentives are set up to encourage initiative and to remove the inertia of limited activity by the 
targeted constituencies. The result is often the emergence of national VC industries and related 
programs that have solely domestic relevance, attract little institutional finance from foreign 
investors, and are heavily dependent on public support for both investment funds and operational 
costs. This reality is currently being ignored in a host of emerging countries across the world as 
they seek to emulate advanced Western economies by the promotion of de novo venture capital 
industries. 
 
2. Market failure is what happens when you don’t give me money; and a rational, 
objective and rigorous economic analysis is what has happened when I don’t give you 
money. 
 
The state as apologist  
 
Technically, a ‘market failure’ exists when the price established in the market does not equal the 
marginal social benefit of a good and thereby results in an under supply from producers. Market 
failures occur for four main reasons: the abuse of market power resulting in imperfect 
competition; markets ignoring the impact of economic activity on those outside the market; when 
markets attempt to provide many types of public goods; and the presence of asymmetric 
information or uncertainty confounding optimal decisions. Early-stage equity finance in unproven 
young firms seeking to commercialize novel technologies in nascent or immature markets 
potentially can give rise to several types of market failure. For example, when the market does 
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not provide sufficient finance to meet the demands of young firms regardless of their willingness 
to pay the price (interest payment, collateral guarantee etc.) required. Asymmetric information 
increases the uncertainty and risks for providers of capital, many of which would rather leave the 
market than provide finance under these unknown (and unknowable) conditions. The absence of 
finance means that existing companies fail through lack of access to necessary resources or 
growth is restricted and new companies are not formed.5 Each of these outcomes may represent a 
significant social and economic cost to society. 
 
It can be taken as a sine qua non that governments in free market economies would prefer not to 
intervene in financial markets unless there is clear evidence of a market failure leading to a 
serious misallocation of resources. Further, governments have to be convinced that their actions 
will effectively address the identified problem at an acceptable level of public costs. Thus, 
governments (and the appropriate competition authorities) need to be convinced both that a 
market failure exists and that it should be addressed. The fact that many financial institutions are 
loath to finance young firms is not per se evidence of a market failure. Indeed, if the young firms 
are highly risky and the expected return of any external investment does not provide an 
acceptable risk-adjusted return to investors, then the commercial decision to deny finance is 
unquestionably rational regardless of any social benefits forgone. Those arguing the case for 
intervention have to demonstrate that there are specific and resolvable circumstances that prevent 
capital markets from acting efficiently and finding an equilibrium price at which the market 
clears. In short, given the robustness with which many markets work despite wilful public 
attempts at intervention, the onus of proof should be on those critics that argue that the market is 
not working.6 
 
Absence of information leading to the decision not to offer finance at any price would constitute 
a market failure, which could justify some form of government intervention. Perverse incentives 
that bias the normal matching of supply and demand would also constitute a market failure. For 
example, loan guarantees may, on occasion, have this effect on the actions of both capital 
providers and users (Riding and Haines, 2001). There is a substantial literature on the interests 
and actions of the key actors in the venture capital process and the effect of their behaviour on the 
optimal allocation of finance to potentially attractive young businesses.7 This literature centers on 
a treatment of the genesis, effect and management of agency costs as faced by the providers of 
capital (limited partners), the users of capital (portfolio firms) and the allocating intermediary 
agents (the venture capitalists or general partners). The effect of moral hazard issues on the 
behavior of actors in this market is central to these arguments (Burgemann and Hege, 1998). That 
an agent can act in a manner which adversely affects the supply or demand of capital, is in part 
based on the absence of full and equal information available to all the parties to the transaction, 
i.e. the information asymmetry problem. Thus, the actions of government, in addition to 
providing more capital from public resources, also focus on correcting the causes of market 
failure in order that public interventions in private markets remain effective and temporary. For 
example, the popular promotion and subsidization of Business Angel Networks is one means by 
                                                
5 This situation is currently occurring in several market economies in Spring 2009 as banks reduce lending in 
preference for building up their severely depleted balance sheets. 
6 Readers may smile at these comments in the light of the unprecedented chaos in financial markets since the Fall 
2008. However, we do not believe that this maelstrom should be taken as the norm and thus seen as the context in 
which most financial transactions will occur over time. 
7 For a review of this literature, see Gompers and Lerner (2005). 
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which several governments seek to address a continuing information gap in the immature, 
informal investor markets (Mason and Harrison, 1997). 
 
Thus, the case for public intervention is largely predicated on the belief that some correctable 
inefficiencies exists in the market’s allocation of finance to SMEs. These are seen as particularly 
harmful to national economic interests (welfare) in the case of high potential/high impact, young, 
growth oriented firms. Knowledge-based young firms whose assets are largely tacit in nature, e.g. 
intellectual property rights, are seen as especially vulnerable to constraints in the supply of 
finance given their modest internal resources and a general inability to attract debt finance at 
formation and early-stages of growth because of their irregular and immature cash flows (Storey 
and Tether, 1998). In short, their future value is not fully reflected in a present level of 
collaterizable assets which are sufficiently attractive to lenders. 
 
That financial markets can discriminate against SMEs is not a new concept. The Macmillan 
Report (1931) argued that small British firms seeking sums under £250,000 (approximately £7 
million at current prices) were discriminated against. Seventy two years later, HM Treasury 
(2003) in the United Kingdom has argued that a market failure continues to exist at between 
£250,000 and £1 million with sums under £2 million being still very difficult to access. The 
assumption that capital market failures exist for young firms is virtually taken as a given in 
government policy documents at both national and international levels including the European 
Commission, the OECD and the World Bank.  
 
Yet, contemporary national studies of SMEs’ business environments find it is only in exceptional 
cases that small and medium-sized firms (including high potential young firms) are repeatedly 
denied access to finance. In the UK Small Business Survey conducted by academic researchers 
on behalf of the UK government’s Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(BERR), only 17% of firms interviewed between 2004 and 2007 reported any constraint on 
access to finance with 12% receiving an outright refusal. Being a ‘growth oriented firms’ was not 
seen as a significant variable in any refusal to access finance (Cosh, Hughes, Bullock and Milner, 
2008). Similarly, Maula and Murray (2003) using Finnish data also noted that only 6-7% of fast-
growth SMEs were observed to have any problem with access to finance. These figures would 
suggest that it would be more sensible to have the statement ‘no evidence of market failure 
exists’ as the Null Hypothesis, at least in countries with well-developed financial markets. Yet, 
the actual policy reality is that the existence of a market failure is commonly taken as a given 
‘fact’ in several advanced industrialized economies. All too often government policy documents 
repeat the term market failure with little acknowledgement to the paucity of research evidence 
supporting such a strong assertion. In reality, the research evidence is that many studies 
purporting to investigate this phenomenon are skeptical as to the generic existence or material 
effect of a SME ‘financing gap’, although disentangling supply and demand factors in 
determining whether such a gap exists can be technically challenging (Berger and Udell, 2006). 
 
This is not to suggest that market failure does not or cannot exist. Indeed, there are structural 
circumstances that suggest it is uneconomic for VC firms to provide small tranches of money to 
young firms (Murray and Marriott, 1998; European Commission, 2005). Many VC firms in the 
membership of the  British Venture Capital Association (BVCA), no longer wish to offer 
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applicant investee firms sums of money under a minimum of £5 million.8 However, this debate 
on the minimum scale of VC investment masks the fact that many firms seeking finance are not 
attractive enough to professional investors in an asset class where the risk reward ratio has 
persistently acted against the interests of investors. The concept of ‘market readiness’ is only just 
coming into policy fashion. This approach reappraises the market for SME finance from a 
demand-side perspective. It seeks to answer the conundrum that many SMEs argue that access to 
finance is extraordinarily difficult while at the same time venture capitalists state with equal 
conviction that they have more money than opportunities in which to invest (Queen, 2002)  
 
3. The rest of the world is not America. We can borrow but ultimately we have to find our 
own solutions  
 
The state as groupie  
 
The USA with the largest and most established VC industry9 in the world is the single benchmark 
against which all other VC industries are compared (European Commission and US Department 
of Commerce, 2005). This is sensibly so, as the US has consistently been one of the most 
profitable VC markets (Rosa, Machado, and Raade, 2006) in addition to having identified and 
financed some of the world’s most outstanding new companies (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). The 
returns to the US top quartile VC firms have been attractive (and for some investments quite 
spectacular) and have greatly advantaged both the general partnership’s managers and their 
limited partner investors. This US success is in marked contrast to the disappointing returns that 
early-stage, classic VC has recorded in the UK, continental Europe and beyond. It appears that 
the US industry remains exceptional in its greater ability to recognize, nurture and benefit from 
the investment in early-stage companies across a series of new and disruptive technologies and 
markets (Murray and Lott, 1992; Dimov and Murray, 2007). 
 
It is thus not remarkable that government A or B may state that official government policy is to 
emulate as closely as possible the successes of an American exemplar. Yet, this goal is often little 
more than an aspirational slogan. For example, in the UK, public ambitions have covered creating 
a Silicon Fen (Cambridge), a Silicon Valley (South Wales) and a Silicon Glen (the Edinburgh 
Glasgow corridor in Scotland). Further, we have Ireland, Finland, Belgium, New Zealand and a 
host of other smaller countries each assuming policy targets for VC financing that are based on 
emulating the actions and history of the (presently) largest economy in the world, with the most 
successful technology-based corporations and, similarly, the most advanced educational 
infrastructure in science and technology research. Regardless of the implausibility of such goals 
(Leslie and Kargon, 1996), they are an abnegation of the peculiar and unique processes by which 
individual national economies develop. If we ascribe to the logic of ‘path dependency’, a UK, 
Brazil, India or China cannot replicate the US experience (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; 
Kenney and von Burg, 1999). At best, national policy makers may be able to draw out a number 
                                                
8 For example, 3i plc, an extremely successful venture capital firm which was originally formed by the UK 
government in 1945 specifically to address the problems facing small businesses identified in the Macmillan Report 
no longer invests in the start-up and early-stage markets. Similarly, Apax Partners, an important early VC funder of 
start-up firms, in (2003 formally announced that requests for risk capital finance of under £10 million would no 
longer be considered 
9 Here we define ‘classic’ venture capital in accord with common practice and exclude private equity investments in 
mature and established companies particularly Management Buy-Outs. 
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of generalizable lessons from the US experience. For example, much of the present success of 
Silicon Valley is based on the foundation of several large companies intimately connected to the 
defense industry from the 1930s onwards (Saxenian, 1994; Leslie and Kargon, 1996; Page, West 
and Bamford, 2005). The idea that creating a ‘military industrial complex’ comparable to the US 
(and possibly Israel) might be a precondition of a successful VC industry only emphasizes the 
need to think in terms of peculiar national histories rather than electing to follow blind 
emulation.10  
 
What nations may be able to do is to understand the reasons and precursors for the formation of 
US systems for the financing of young and novel industries in order to make their own 
adaptations. Israel has colonized an early-stage VC space very successfully as an off-shoring of 
US technology particularly (but not exclusively) in its civil application of originally military 
products and services, e.g. encryption and other security software. Similarly, Ireland has 
historically been highly successful as a low tax European entrepôt and destination for foreign 
corporations wishing to have a trading base within the European Union. Its early-stage VC 
activity has been strongly oriented around servicing the large community of foreign owned, 
technology-based corporations resident in Ireland. For Finland, its decision to become an 
innovation-based, knowledge economy was hugely influenced by the collapse of its Soviet export 
market in the early 1990s (Sabel and Saxenian, 2008). The need to finance speculative innovative 
ideas outside traditional financing channels led to Finnish government support for the emergence 
of a VC industry in the mid 1990s (Maula and Murray, 2003). In the developing world, India 
created a vibrant VC industry in response to the emergence of the outsourced software services 
industry (Dossani and Kenney, 2002) while South Africa has struggled to develop VC despite a 
promising enabling environment (Lingelbach, Murray, and Gilbert, 2008). What unites each of 
these illustrations is the uniqueness of each country’s history and the specific circumstances 
leading to the formation of a national VC industry. 
 
In fact, we would argue that it remains an open question as to whether or not VC is mainly an 
American innovation that has been diffused and adapted for various other national environments. 
A credible argument can be made that risk capital is a global phenomenon of several distinct 
variants and with historical antecedents predating American VC activity. Thus, it may well be 
that the potential for significant venture or risk capital activity is endemic to several or a majority 
of societies but that weak institutional environments have inhibited their development when 
compared to a number of advanced Western economies (La Porta et al., 1998 and 2000).  
 
The question is not whether the USA is an exemplar in VC activities. In reality, the USA is not an 
exemplar. Rather, a small number of American locations or clusters have sufficient size and 
centrality to enjoy world scale impact in knowledge-based investment. These include Silicon 
Valley, Greater Boston and arguably North Carolina, Austin and Seattle. Outside these centers, 
the USA has little obvious advantage over Europe or other regions. Policy makers should 
sensibly be asking themselves what are the preconditions for successfully creating an industry 
based on entrepreneurial risk - and do such preconditions exist in their own economy? Only after 
meeting these requirements is it credible to start looking at the technical questions of knowledge 
                                                
10 To date, only Israel has also been able to harvest a comparable (albeit much smaller) civilian innovation premium 
from its high defense spending unlike Russia or South Africa.  
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asset production and scale and scope economies in technology or other product markets in order 
to ascertain the probabilities of economic survival and success. 
 
4. If you believe that all men are born equal – don’t become a venture capitalist. Socialists 
make lousy venture capitalists  
 
The state as wimp  
 
One of the biggest challenges for policy makers in seeking to implement a US model of VC 
activity is to attempt to introduce a new model of behavior without also importing or recognizing 
the social and cultural underpinnings of the American model. This model of economic activity 
relies on market forces as the pre-eminent allocation and signaling mechanisms. Like Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory of natural selection, entrepreneurial markets allow relatively few winners but 
demand many losers. To operate in this market takes a form of physical and mental toughness 
that is unusually pre-eminent in the Anglo-Saxon competitive and individualistic culture. Max 
Weber in 1904 termed this set of enabling characteristics, the Protestant Ethic. It contrasts 
strongly with a more paternal European social models in which the state is both protector and 
allocator of publicly owned resources.11 The US model is meritocratic and elitist. Its citizens have 
a passion for winning and broadcasting the benefits of success. Of equal importance, Americans 
appear noteworthy in their more tolerant acceptance of failure as a concomitant and necessary 
requirement to the celebration of success. This muscular American economic individualism can 
be compared with, in Hoffstede’s (2001) terms, the lower masculinity of, for example, Nordic 
economies with their preferred emphasis on a societal as opposed to a predominantly individual 
perspective. 
 
Given that democratic governments usually reflect broadly the cultural norms of their electorates, 
while similarly many economists theorize in terms of the behavior of the owners of assets rather 
than concentrating on the entrepreneurial arrangers of assets (Cantillon, 1755; Say, 1815), it is 
very easy to misunderstand the environmental preconditions for entrepreneurial behavior. 
Accordingly, one of many persistent weaknesses in developed, democratic Western governments 
is their attempts to introduce fairness, equity and balance into the entrepreneurship policy 
equation. Entrepreneurial action is exceptional in all communities. Entrepreneurs are a small 
minority in the adult population generally. Even in the USA, only 12% of adults are actively 
involved in the entrepreneurial process of starting new firms (Bosma, Jones, Autio, and Levie, 
2008). For a majority of European countries, ‘Total Entrepreneurial Activity’12 within the 
national adult population is consistently recorded at less than half of the USA value. Such 
estimates are stable over several annual surveys. Government incentives that do not discriminate 
in favor of its more entrepreneurial citizens - which may often be the more educated, the richer or 
the more foreign – unwittingly trade economic advantage for apparent social equity. An 
entrepreneurial policy that does not actively discriminate in favor of growing businesses and their 
owners commanding more and/or better quality assets, including human capital, is at best 
ineffective and at worst hypocritical. 
 
                                                
11 This question of different styles of capitalism with different roles for the state has assumed enormous importance 
in the chaotic capital markets of the Fall, (2008. See The Economist 4th October (2008 pp45-46. 
12 See the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project at http://www.gemconsortium.org 
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5. Governments have as much chance of becoming effective venture capitalists as tax 
collectors have of being loved 
 
The state as loser  
 
If government policy makers on the evidence available believe that the capital markets are 
imperfect in the supply of finance to SMEs, they have a number of choices. The provision of 
direct grants is one means by which the state can circumvent the market allocation process by 
transferring public finance directly to targeted firms on the basis of a set of selection criteria that 
policy makers believe are appropriate. Criteria employed may include firm size, firm sector, firm 
location, priority industry sector, R&D intensity, limited collateral etc. Conversely, they can 
themselves replicate the services supplied by private market principals. In this case, the 
government itself becomes a venture capital provider and addresses the missing or insufficient 
supply of services and actions of the private sector funders. A number of countries have set up 
such commercially focused funds, effectively recruiting investment managers to become public 
employees. For example, the Finnish Industry Investments, the China Hi-tech Venture Capital 
Corporation and GIC Special Investments in Singapore are all publicly owned investment funds 
with significant VC activity. Such activities are direct replications of private VC funds but are 
normally constrained in their investment focus—at least in developed countries— to that area of 
the market which is seen as problematic, e.g. seed capital and start-up finance particularly to 
high-tech ventures.13 Given that the state is providing a service that private, profit motivated 
agents have eschewed, usually for reasons of poor fund performance, it is not surprising that such 
initiatives have often been characterized by high costs and poor returns (Murray, 1998). Public 
venture capital firms are disadvantaged in competing in an area where professional investment 
competences are scarce and accordingly highly rewarded in professional labor markets.14 There is 
a further agency problem in that while public investment executives may wish to be remunerated 
in a comparable manner to their private peers, they are not personally at risk from the negative 
outcome of their poor investment decisions.15 Thus, public funds are commonly hampered by 
limited experience and low competence levels as well as by less well aligned managerial 
incentives. 
 
It is these structural limitations of publicly owned VC funds that have occasioned greater 
contemporary interest in what are termed ‘hybrid’ VC funds (OECD, 2004).The genesis of this 
model is the seminal experiment in the USA of creating Small Business Investment Companies 
under the auspices of the Small Business Administration. While certainly not free of problems in 
its execution (Kleiman and Shulman, 1992), the generic characteristics of the SBIC ‘equity 
enhancement’ model have now been adopted in a range of modified forms by several other 
countries (including Australia, Finland, New Zealand and the UK). The central logic of the use of 
public funds to leverage private investor returns is that it is efficient for the state to use public 
                                                
13 When public financed VC funds compete in product area where there are already private providers, the 
government is vulnerable to charges of ‘crowding out’ private investors 
14 Corporate Venture units have similar problems to public VC funds in attracting professional investment managers 
to work in environments where their actions are constrained by non-commercial objectives and their remuneration is 
influenced by factors outside of their investment record. (Hill et al, (2008) 
15 General partners in a private VC or PE fund are required to also invest a part of their wealth personally in to their 
fund. GPs’ share of the capital gain of the fund is also commonly condition on reaching a ‘hurdle’ of minimum 
performance return linked to the cost of capital of the investors in the fund. 
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finance in order to engineer a range of incentives that encourage private VC firms to work in 
partnership with the state in promoting greater investment activities in areas of interest to public 
policy. In order to attract private interest, the state has to create incentives that address the key 
structural factors that make early-stage investing unattractive to the commercial investor. In 
essence, inducements have to be engineered that materially rebalance the risk/reward ratio of 
speculative risk capital investment in start-up and early-stage companies. There are several 
variants to the hybrid model but essentially the public exchequer becomes directly or indirectly a 
limited partner in the hybrid fund and provides a substantial proportion of the finance available to 
the fund and to investments made to the target group of companies. (In the specific case of the 
SBIC, the government becomes a guarantor or underwriter to the private investors thereby 
increasing the amount of funding that can be raised from commercial sources at an attractive rate 
of interest.) Frequently, the state will provide funding on a 2:1 basis as a ‘special’ investor in the 
fund as, for example, in the UK’s Enterprise Capital Fund scheme or Australia’s Industry 
Investment Fund. In additional, the state will often only require a nominal return in the event of a 
successful investment. If the investment fails, the state will be a subordinated investor 
preferentially writing off its own proportion of the monies committed to the portfolio firm or to 
the aggregate fund.16 
 
Recognizing the sensitivity of VC fund returns to ‘the time cost of capital’, some schemes allow 
the public LP to invest before private fund money is committed. The state will only seek a 
repatriation of its own finance when all other private LPs in the fund have first received an agreed 
share of capital gain contingent on a successful investment. Thus, the private fund gains the 
benefit of substantial public investment at a lower cost of capital and with the public LP bearing a 
greater risk of loss in the event of a partial or complete investment failure. This public leverage 
effect can have a material effect on the performance of the fund. Jääskeläinen et al. (2007) 
estimate that these asymmetric public/private risks and rewards can increase the terminal, net 
‘cash to cash’ returns (i.e. Internal Rate of Return) to private LPs by up to 8%. However, these 
authors caution that such engineering of incentives can only work to increase the returns of a 
hybrid fund that has generated some positive capital gain via its investment decisions. 
 
6. Downside guarantee funds do just that – they guarantee that there will be a downside  
 
The state as sucker  
 
The most attractive incentive to a private investor occurs if the state is prepared to guarantee the 
level of risk of the investor (LP) by underwriting part or all of the contingent loss of individual 
portfolio investments made or the aggregate losses of the fund. Guaranteed underwriting of the 
investments of private agents in order to encourage them to undertake actions desired by the state 
has a considerable history that long predates its involvement with VC (Irwin, 2007; European 
Commission, 2001 and 2005). However, guarantees become especially useful in circumstances 
where there is a high level of unquantifiable uncertainty. For example, the large and subordinated 
position of the state as a ‘special’ limited partner in the UK’s Regional Venture Capital Funds 
was necessary before private investors (including the publicly owned international financing 
agency, the European Investment Fund) were prepared to co-invest in the new program. The 
                                                
16 Later public VC schemes in the UK have seen the state negotiate a position as preferred creditor (e.g. Enterprise 
Capital Fund Scheme) rather than as subordinate investor (e.g. Regional VC Fund Scheme) 
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terms accepted by the state as a ‘special’ limited partner included being ‘the first investor in and 
the last out’; a cap on its returns; and, above all, the recipient of first losses. These conditions 
meant that in effect the state guaranteed the downside of the fund up to the level of its total public 
investment. Likewise in the United States, the SBA’s underwriting of loans taken out by SBICs 
has the same guarantee effect. Such schemes have also been in evidence in continental Europe 
with France, Denmark and Germany specifically providing guarantees to private sector risk 
capital investors (see, for example, WFG, tbg and KfW in Germany, SOFARIS in France and the 
Equity Guarantee Program in Denmark). In the United States, a number of states have also 
provided guarantees to support local VC funds, including Oklahoma, Arkansas, Iowa, Ohio, 
Utah, and Michigan (NASVF, 2006). 
 
The central issue with a guarantee scheme centers on exactly the nature of the incentive to the 
private investor and the conditions under which it will be triggered. Equity leverage using 
subordinated state finance has a multiplier effect on the investor’s return, amplifying both the 
rewards and costs of good and bad investments, respectively.17 In contrast, a guarantee gives no 
incentive for the general partner to make good investments but reduces the cost to the limited 
partners of making a poor or ill judged investment. Accordingly, the guarantee blunts the salience 
of negative market signals by reducing the impact of their consequences (Gilson, 2003). The 
guarantee can thus allow the creation of a ‘moral hazard’ whereby the investor does not bear the 
full commercial consequences of his or her actions. Accordingly, an injudicious but rational 
investor has an incentive to make riskier investments that would be the case if no underwriting 
was available given the asymmetric responsibilities.18 In the authors’ opinion, any public scheme 
that serves to lessen the costs of poor decisions while being neutral to good decisions is 
problematic. This is especially so when (as noted) public funds or private funds working at the 
most challenging early-stages of the investment market are likely to have greater problems in 
attracting the involvement of the most experienced and successful investment managers. 
 
 
7. Ventures capitalists believe that seed capital is very important – so long as they don’t 
have to provide it  
 
The state as pocket money  
 
In a British Venture Capital Association sponsored survey in 1990, the top twenty venture 
capitalists in the UK were asked their opinion as to the greatest shortcoming of the industry in its 
first decade of significant operation (Murray, 1992).19 The respondents, who included 
representatives from both ‘classic’ VC and Private Equity (Management Buy Out) fund 
managers, were unanimous in their opinions. They cited the inability of the UK to find a means 
                                                
17 In the event of a failed investment, the state may still seek a minimum return on its cost of capital. The later ECF 
funds have this preferential requirement for the state’s interests imposed on recipient funds. 
18 Exactly the same criticism is being used to discuss the system of giving bank employees large performance 
bonuses. Market traders were incentivised to take considerable risks given that they did not bear the full costs of any 
negative outcomes.  
19 The author arranged for the forthcoming survey to be announced in the Financial Times. The article stated that the 
researcher would meet the UK industry’s top VC investors as identified by the British Venture Capital Association. 
Accordingly, some forty plus chairman and CEOs of venture capital companies contacted the author requesting that 
he meet them urgently! 
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of financing start-up and early-stage, high potential enterprises as successfully as the VC industry 
in the USA. The dearth of seed funding was particularly noted. This situation remains similar, 
and arguably worse, nearly twenty years later. Seed and other early-stage capital has remained a 
chronically unsuccessful investment focus outside the possible exceptions of East and West Coast 
America. Targeted primarily at technology-based new enterprises with products yet to be 
commercialized, seed capital investment combines multiple uncertainties from technology, 
market and managerial sources. In addition, seed investing is particularly unattractive for VC 
investors in that it demands very considerable managerial input from the general partnership of 
the VC firm into the fledgling enterprises while at the same time employing very little capital 
from the funds under management.  
 
Accordingly, the European VC model with its concentration of small, specialist early-stage funds 
has been characterized by very low returns and several failed funds. This has resulted in an exit 
of commercial focused VC firms from this market. Consequently, seed, start-up and early-stage 
financing is now an area of the risk capital market where public funded VC firms predominate 
(Small Business Service, 2006b; Pierrakis and Mason, 2008). An earlier evaluation of the 
European Commission’s European Seed Capital Pilot Program showed that one quarter of the 21 
country funds surveyed would have become insolvent within three years - even without making 
an investment - given the very high start-up and transactions costs in relation to the funds under 
management (Murray, 1998). Classic VC funds in the UK have addressed this challenging 
asymmetry between the (high) management costs incurred and the (low) returns generated from 
exits and fee income from the modest funds managed by either abandoning seed activity or by 
increasing funds under management and refocusing activities on later stage growth and 
development capital investments. A number of general partnerships have reallocated their efforts 
entirely from venture capital to private equity deals. Nor is this situation unique to the UK. The 
FII program in Finland was sanctioned for being set up to undertake early-stage investments 
while in practice concentrating its resources in private equity deals (Maula and Murray, 2003). 
Similarly, in an emerging economy context, South African private equity funds that have 
established VC funds in the past are now scaling back or abandoning those efforts for much the 
same reasons (Lingelbach et al., 2008). 
 
The US model of seed investing implicitly recognizes that seed capital is, in isolation, not a 
viable commercial product, at least not when delivered by a VC fund. Rather, it is the first, 
‘intelligence seeking’ stage of a holistic investment process that will normally provide multiple 
rounds of follow-on finance to successful firms up to an exit event via either an IPO or a trade 
sale. Accordingly, US VC firms undertaking seed capital are multi-stage investors and are 
commonly managing funds of over one billion US dollars. By such means, the strategically 
important but extraordinarily high risk/return ratio of seed capital deals are attenuated in being 
amortized across the total range of activities of the fund (Dimov and Murray, 2007). 
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8. The archetype venture capitalist has razor sharp teeth, can smell blood at three 
kilometers, has a paranoid/psychotic need to achieve lucrative deals, reveres capital gain 
above all things – and likes flower arranging  
 
The state as innocent abroad  
 
In order for the state to work effectively with venture capitalists, policy makers need to 
understand the modus operandi of the private sector organizations and commercial managements 
with which they wish to collaborate. Without such an understanding of the instrumentality and 
aggressively meritocratic and professional culture of the risk capital sector there is a high 
probability that they will not be able to engineer sufficiently attractive incentives to ensure 
investment professionals’ collaboration. Perhaps even more likely, less experienced public 
departments will devise incentives that are inappropriately generous, thereby diminishing the 
potential public welfare by the degree of over payment to their private agents. 
 
Venture capitalists have very demanding interests as investors. Ideally, they wish for a very high 
return with negligible risk. They do not court risk but rather manage it professionally – for a price 
broadly measured in their significant ownership of the portfolio company’s stock. Governments’ 
interest in encouraging VC firms to invest in early-stage activities requires the incentivization of 
general partners who would otherwise seek to moderate risk by abandoning start-ups and moving 
toward later stage and more certain investments. Thus, it becomes important to understand the 
motivations of the private collaborators in order to design incentives that encourage them to meet 
government’s desired outcomes. 
 
In reality, the government will not attract the best venture capitalists to engage in hybrid 
activities, at least in countries with already-established private equity and venture capital 
industries. The investment record of such general partnerships ensures that they are well known 
to institutional investors. Indeed, established VC firms with an upper quartile performance have a 
waiting list of institutions wishing to be allowed to participate in their next fund raising. Thus, the 
partnerships available to the state are either VC firms with less enviable track records or, 
frequently, commercial but untested investment managers anxious to enter the VC/PE market and 
seeing a government leveraged fund as one means of entry. For such managers, the hybrid fund 
becomes a ‘loose brick’ in the wall surrounding the VC/PE community (Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990). If such an investment team can be accepted and can subsequently demonstrate a clear 
competence as professional equity investors, they have the opportunity to raise substantial 
follow-on funds on the back of their own performance. Thus, publicly supported hybrid funds 
have become one of the few channels by which new entrants can enter a rapidly maturing VC and 
PE market. 
 
Governments have belatedly recognized their negotiating power. Recent calls for the design and 
management of new hybrid funds in the UK’s Enterprise Capital Fund scheme (Small Business 
Service, 2006) were put out to public bidding. The state by employing its own professional 
advisers was able to undertake due diligence on the investment teams that sought to be part of the 
scheme. Somewhat ironically, the VC firm applicants were subjected to the same type of scrutiny 
that they commonly impose on potential investee firms. The UK government through its 
involvement in a series of new VC fund programs since 1997 has been able to accumulate its own 
professional competence in both designing and staffing public/private investment funds. With 
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greater enterprise policy networking, venture focused skills sets are now being disseminated 
between policy makers from several countries. As the playing field has leveled, venture 
capitalists now need to understand the nature of the (public) beast as much as the policy makers 
need to understand their private sector agents. 
 
9. Kleiner Perkins, Atlas Venture, Apax and Technologie Holdings require their investors 
to wait ten years for full returns – the Government would prefer to wait one year  
 
The state as importunate  
 
As noted above, in order to engage successfully with the VC industry and meet its own 
objectives, the state has had to learn the paradigms and heuristics by which this specialist form of 
entrepreneurial finance is conducted. These industry practices and routines often evolve for 
highly pragmatic reasons. Equity funding in a classic VC scenario will follow the well known J 
Curve (Meyer and Mathonet, 2005) with the cumulative value of the fund being less than the 
money committed for the first years of the fund’s operations. Bürgel (2000) in one of the first 
forensic studies of VC performance analyzed detailed investment cash flows on a sample of some 
eighty UK based funds. He demonstrated that funds typically did not start to show a positive net 
gain in value until around the fifth year of operation. It is because of the long gestation of many 
young enterprises before demonstrating any significant commercial value (Miller and Friesen, 
1984; Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001) that the GPs have to require of limited partners that their 
investment is locked in for an industry standard (in the US and Europe) of a minimum ten year 
period.  
 
Yet, the time needed to demonstrate a clear investment performance and the time given to 
publicly supported funds to provide evidence of such an effect is often out of kilter. The 
provision of public financing to a private fund raises considerable governance issues. The state 
rightly wishes to see the positive consequences of its risk bearing actions. Yet, the demands made 
on such funds for evidence of success or, more vaguely, public value-added are often importunate 
and made unreasonably early into the investment cycle. Auditing the Present Value of a highly 
immature portfolio firm is illusory and the industry recommended practice of carrying 
investments at cost until an independent evaluation event is appropriate given the high 
uncertainty. It is a source of added pressure on less informed investors that failed investments are 
much more likely to be realized before investment successes. In the argot of the industry, ‘lemons 
ripen before plums’. 
 
All industries have their peculiar and specific practices and conditions. Again, public investors 
who are unaware of the heuristics of the industry are unlikely to do other than increase the 
destructive pressures on early-stage, hybrid fund arrangements. 
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10. Specialist users of advanced technological products and services rarely insist that the 
technology they purchase was conceived, designed and manufactured in a nomadic 
community of two hundred souls on the north side of a fjord some five hundred miles from 
the nearest Starbucks  
 
The state as romantic or holy fool  
 
The state has a constitutional responsibility to protect and nurture all of the diverse communities 
and groups within its borders. This is in part articulated in a redistributive function that transfers 
resources from the nation’s centers of highest economic activity to regions or communities more 
remote or otherwise disadvantaged. A significant proportion of total public activity is allocated to 
these tasks and involves education, training, employment and capital investment activities across 
a range of public administration offices. At the same time as having a range of social policy 
actions, the state is also interested in stimulating future economic activity by investing in new 
innovative and productive capacity both at the research and commercial stages (Small Business 
Service, 2004). Resources to create new high-tech industries are attractive to all regions in an 
economy and no more so than for economically depressed regions that have often declined from 
an illustrious industrial past. Yet, the reality of scale and scope advantages, particularly within 
networked economies which demonstrate exponential benefits of proximity and growth, is that 
new investment in technology and other new knowledge assets is likely to be much more fruitful 
if added incrementally alongside other existing assets in so-called clusters (Porter, 1998). 
 
Thus, policy makers face a conflict between their heads and their hearts. The more effective 
allocative decision would be to invest in existing areas of research excellence and hope that 
‘trickle down’ development theories actually work. At best, most countries outside the largest ten 
world economies will only have a very small number, if any, of centers of genuinely world class 
technology-based activity. In reality, few policy makers will be left to make such important 
decisions without political sanction. The political process rightly must assume responsibility for 
redistributive actions regardless of technical optimization. In an ideal world, the stage is set for an 
informed debate over priorities, means and ends. The reality is often quite different. 
 
Much of regional policy is more accurately understood as a social transfer masquerading as an 
investment in innovative capacity. This is beautifully articulated by one policy maker who said to 
one of the authors: I know that the fund has been created for early-stage technology investments 
but with a little money and patience this could once again be a first class television factory. The 
statement has the charm of truth. Essentially public money allocated for equity investments in 
new technology applications was to be diverted in order to sustain the operations of an 
uncompetitive factory producing a commodity product in a remote region of a highly developed 
Western economy. The region was also the home territory of a powerful, ruling party politician 
anxious not to see a major increase in local unemployment if the factory closed down. Here, an 
innovation policy program provided a convenient ‘pork barrel’. 
 
Publicly supported venture capital funds have been particularly vulnerable to being hijacked by 
social and regional interests. Venture capital is ‘politically sexy’ and smacks of modernity, highly 
educated and well paid work forces, clean industries and warm images of California. As a result, 
the less economically developed regions of most advanced Western economies (and some 
developing countries) are littered with small early-stage VC funds with weak managements, 
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weaker balance sheets and negligible deal flow. They commonly do not survive beyond the 
exhaustion of the public subsidy. (Such funds for obvious reasons are rarely in receipt of genuine 
‘matched’ private financing.) They are the outward manifestation of policies that have 
uncritically seen the link between venture capital and innovation as causal and sufficient. The 
overlaying of a European economic development, investment infrastructure through the European 
Commission can add another layer of opportunity and some times policy confusion for European 
states. Indeed, the rules of much European development funds activity proscribes placing finance 
into areas which are not officially classified as economically disadvantaged. The term 
‘disadvantaged’ can often be translated as meaning regions that have neither the supply nor the 
quality of universities, research laboratories, large and small technology businesses, knowledge 
workers or managerial manpower. Yet each of these resources is required for the construction and 
execution an innovation policy able to be assisted by venture capital activity. Thus, the very 
places that can use this funding least efficiently are often the places most likely to be in receipt of 
this form of financing. Hans Christian Anderson was prescient. It is not just kings that do not 
have new clothes. Regions can be equally naked. 
 
In explaining the misallocation of innovation funding and entrepreneurial finance activities into 
social programs, we are not suggesting that poor or less advantaged regions are left in a virtual 
laager of poverty and deprivation. In a decent and democratic society such discrimination should 
be unacceptable. What we are suggesting is that to suborn a specific set of (innovation) policy 
instruments in order to engage in separate (social) policy actions is likely to be suboptimal for 
both innovation and social policy, irrespective of the criteria employed. Frequently, the objective 
of local public servants is to maximize inward transfers of public monies regardless of the 
opportunity cost of their allocation. Thus, in the case of a VC initiative, antecedent questions 
determining the quality and volume of technological opportunities sufficient to sustain a fund 
structure with a reasonable probability of attractive returns are rarely asked. The criteria and 
operational conditions of public schemes can work to frustrate the goals they seek to achieve. A 
worst case scenario in such policy making may occur if a primary reason for the local 
establishment of such a fund is national/regional pride, i.e. region X has one and they are 
certainly no better than us! In these rather common circumstances, public attempts to subsidize 
the emergence of a local VC industry via the financing of a number of small stand-alone funds 
can result in little more than the temporary creation of a status symbol or policy ‘fashion 
accessory’. 
 
11. The good thing about evaluating seed and incubator funds on the cost of capital (IRR) 
to the government is that it is relatively unambiguous, clear and simple. The bad thing is 
that such a method of evaluation is completely inappropriate.  
 
The state as irrational rationalist  
 
Venture capital has become in the last twenty years a new ‘asset class’ primarily available for 
institutional investors that wish to introduce a further level of diversity and variance into their 
core portfolios of equities, bonds and other alternative investments (see the industry promotional 
literature of the NVCA, BVCA, EVCA). Early investors into upper quartile VC and private 
equity funds have seen highly attractive long term returns (Rosa and Raade, 2006). A core 
requirement of an asset class is sufficiently long term and credible quantitative metrics in order 
that professional investors and actuaries may be able to construct mixed instrument portfolios of 
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desired risk/return trade-offs. The very nature of a typically 10 year, fixed term VC fund is such 
that performance metrics are not instantly available compared to a traded public stock. However, 
over the investment cycle investors can gain an increasingly accurate representation of terminal 
fund performance from year five and beyond (Bürgel, 2000). Internal Rate of Return and capital 
gain multiples are the two most common measurements of VC fund performance (Fenn et al., 
1995; Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Such measures which reflect the opportunity costs of 
investment allocations are entirely appropriate for commercial investors in their assessment of the 
effectiveness of the general partners of their funds. Over time, standardized investment guidelines 
imposed by VC and PE national associations on their members have reduced the idiosyncrasies 
and occasionally misinformation of GPs’ performance reporting to institutional investors (LPs). 
 
It is entirely reasonable that early-stage funds confirm to industry practice in their reporting 
procedures. However, when such funds are public/private hybrids, the information provided only 
allows for a strictly economic or commercial evaluation. While this is of pre-eminent importance 
to the private partners in such a relationship, it is only of partial value to the public investor. It 
needs to be remembered that most public limited partners agree subordinated returns in order to 
ensure the necessary leverage incentives to their private co-investors in the fund. For the public 
investor, often requiring a base return determined by the cost of the state’s capital, a 
commercially attractive return is important only in ensuring the continued participation of the 
private partners. The objective of their public support of the hybrid fund is in the long run, public 
welfare returns contingent on the new investment activity. Thus, the state is primarily interested 
in creating an infrastructure and competencies conducive to the accelerated production of new 
knowledge assets and, critically, their effective commercial exploitation.  
 
The celebrated Israeli Yozma Program started in 1993 as a public initiative from the Office of the 
Chief Scientist before being privatized in 1997. It signaled these wider interests by offering, at its 
formation, to sell the public involvement in the ten new VC funds created by the program back to 
the participating private investors within the first five years.20 In essence, the Israeli state acted as 
a catalyst in promoting the emergence of a VC industry. It then withdrew from a direct 
commercial involvement when the investment results clearly indicated the commercial viability 
of investment activities fueled by Israeli intellectual property and publicly supported, advanced 
research capabilities (Avnimelech et al., 2004). In the USA, the Small Business Administration’s 
SBIC program is arguably the best known, and most emulated, of such state assisted schemes. 
However, the running of two quite separate SBIC schemes has added some confusion to 
outsiders. The debenture SBIC program, which was created in 1958 and uses the state to facilitate 
loans to licensed SBICs in order to leverage private capital, has been judged a success (US Small 
Business Administration, 2003). A second program, the participating securities SBICs, started as 
an experiment in 1994 and was designed to encourage early-stage investments by the SBA 
investing additional equity directly in the SBICs via a public investment. This latter scheme was 
terminated in 2004 after the sharp market turndown in technology stocks in the year 2000 left the 
SBA with a total investment exposure of over $11 billion. A strictly commercial appraisal would 
be positive to both the Israeli Yozma program and the UK’s 3i initiative which was also 
successfully privatized in 1994. The SBA’s debenture SBICs would be seen as commercially 
positive and the participating securities variant would be judged a commercial failure. Yet, such a 
                                                
20 While the Israeli government required a predetermined exit premium, private partners in eight of the ten supported 
funds bought out the public interest to become exclusively private VC funds. 
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partial conclusion would greatly underestimate the SBICs’ impact on the three of the largest and 
most successful VC industries in the world. The US and UK programs were materially 
responsible for training the first national cohort of professional venture capitalists in the post war 
period up until the early/mid 1980s . Similarly, the Yozma program replicated an advanced risk 
capital investment infrastructure in Israel in by the late the 1990s. Their impact has been very 
considerably larger than an exclusive analysis of fund performance would suggest. 
 
However, all too often, the state’s efforts are measured against the benchmark of private investor 
interests. Wider cost benefit analyses incorporating mechanisms that price the externalities and 
spillovers of the fund’s activities. For example, the training of investment managers, the 
orientation of university research departments to commercial spin-out activities, the construction 
of a professional SME support network of accountants, lawyers, patent attorneys etc., the 
dissemination of innovative practices throughout the wider business community are usually 
remarkable as evaluation criteria because of their general absence outside academic studies. This 
is not to argue that the performance of the fund is of secondary relevance to the state. A failed 
fund is likely to produce little of the desired externalities and spillovers noted. However, the 
investment activity’s financial performance is a necessary but insufficient benchmark. Public 
program evaluations have to address both the advantages and limitations of using market 
measures in a policy context if they are not to draw erroneous policy conclusions. 
 
12. It is evident that the Institutions of State can change and adapt to meet new ideas and 
opportunities. After all, the Dark Ages in Europe only lasted five hundred years. 
 
The state as architect not mechanic  
 
One can ‘kick start’ a motorbike but not a VC industry. It is all too infrequently noted that the 
evolution of a credible VC industry is measured in decades rather than in single years (see issues 
of path dependency in Meditation 2). It is also tempting for policy makers to concentrate on the 
‘tactics’ of setting up a new fund without a wider understanding of the necessary ‘strategies’ that 
need to be put into place to create an environment compatible with risk capital activity. As noted, 
a frequent question posed by policy makers is how can one emulate the successes of a US or UK 
industry. In seeking to answer this question the new institutional economics of North (1990 and 
2005) and others is of considerable utility. Institutional writers have recognized, in seeking to 
define conducive entrepreneurial and investment environments, the critical importance of 
‘context’ and, perhaps above all, of ‘the rule of law’ (La Porta et al., 1997 and 2000). A growing 
awareness of the importance of context is also similarly being seen in the field of 
entrepreneurship research and policy formation (Phan, 2004; Audretsch, Grilo, & Thurik, 2007). 
To date, entrepreneurship as a subject area has largely been dominated by individual-level and 
dispositional approaches (Shane, 2004; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Sorensen, 2007).21 
Accordingly, the three conditions that Gilson (2003) argues must exist simultaneously if a VC 
industry is to emerge, i.e. entrepreneurs, funds for investment and an investment vehicle that 
creates the right incentives, are quite correct. However, they are ‘necessary but not sufficient’ 
conditions. Their creation and employment is only possible if institutional precursors allow an 
environment in which such resources can be mobilized. 
 
                                                
21 We are grateful to Erkko Autio for guidance in discussions on the role of context to Entrepreneurial research. 
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That the importance of a transparent, open and honest trading environment to entrepreneurial 
activity might come as a revelation to academics would surprise most high technology 
entrepreneurs. An abiding concern as to the piracy of their intellectual property by dishonest 
firms both at home and abroad is one of the single most defining characteristics of the young 
innovative firm. The need to protect their intellectual assets and the associated economic rents 
strongly influences how, when and where they announce innovations, set up their businesses, 
protect their IP, sell their products and services and with whom they will trade and collaborate 
(Coeurderoy and Murray, 2008). The security provided by the institutional and legal 
environments to vulnerable young firms has a profound effect on their actions. Without the 
entrepreneur’s confidence in the protection of the firm’s valuable and innovative assets via 
recourse to national institutions that defend individual property rights regardless of the status of 
the owner (foreigner/citizen, large firm/start-up firm etc.), the economy’s credibility is severely 
undermined. 
 
 
Pettigrew recently observed that government agencies must focus on both policy and process.22 
The process by which a viable VC industry emerges still remains poorly understood, although 
recent research has begun to focus on the various motors involved (political, economic and 
commercial) and their interrelationships (Lingelbach, 2009; Lingelbach, Gilbert, and Murray, 
2008). Market-oriented programs to stimulate VC tend to focus both on enabling contexts and 
incentives that will attract private sector involvement and co-investment.23 Yet, the relatively 
small number of sustainable, national VC industries to date and the failure of several efforts to 
create more examples belie such confidence. Neither governments nor researchers appear to 
understand adequately the VC emergence process.  
 
 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Since starting to write this paper we have witnessed the onset of chaos in the global financial 
markets. In the face of the cataclysmic events starting in the Fall of 2008, which can for once 
accurately be described as ‘without parallel’, it could be argued that the relevance of this paper 
disappears. The authors also at first entertained a similarly gloomy prognosis. However, on 
greater reflection, we would argue that our paper is exceptionally timely. We have seen in the 
unprecedented two weeks of late September/early October 2008, several of the central banks of 
the world’s largest economies purchasing large or controlling shares in several of their major 
private banks. At virtually a stroke, the growing international market liberalism of the Reagan - 
Thatcher years, which had continued from the early 1980s to the present day, seems to have 
stalled and started to reverse. The focus of our paper has been on how the state and the private 
sector may both learn to live with and gain benefit from each other’s participation in the 
relatively arcane world of early-stage venture capital. A parallel model of public/private co-
                                                
22 Seminar address at the Academy of Management’s Annual Conference, Anaheim, California August 2008 
23 The UK government and the Small Business Service post 1997 would be an exemplar of market-oriented policies 
with a strong co-investment focus. The Regional VC Funds, The Enterprise Capital Funds, the High-Tech Fund and 
the more socially focused Bridges Fund were each launched with public money for a policy purpose yet managed by 
a strongly incentivized private sector. 
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investment is now being played out in the worlds’ major financial centers and is underpinning the 
survival of many banks. Our observations and thoughts - albeit addressing a problem of a more 
modest scale - can be seen as both timely and relevant. 
 
This paper is not intended to be an anti-government polemic. We do not take an ideological or a 
political stance. Our interest is purely instrumental. We are interested in the efficacy of 
government intervention as measured by the promotion of ‘desirable’ outcomes including, for 
example, the genesis and growth of new enterprises or the conversion of intellectual property 
from university laboratory or other sources of innovation into new or better goods and services 
via the medium of new market entrants. We have no interest in criticizing government efforts to 
promote early-stage venture capital activity. Rather, we write as interested academic observers 
committed to fostering a debate on the nature of productive public engagement in 
entrepreneurship policy. We clearly see a role for venture capital in the innovative process - be it 
from formal or informal sources. At the earliest stages of investment, we also see a role for the 
state to be both a supporter of, and an investor in, privately managed risk capital activity. 
 
By design or not, government has become a major player in shaping and stimulating the 
environment in to which the ‘classic’ venture capital industry has emerged. We recognize that, in 
the US, government policy has gone well beyond simply creating a conducive environment for 
the creation and financing of new enterprise. Indeed, US public policy on enterprise and 
innovation has been highly interventionist both at federal and state levels (Lazonick, 2008). 
Similarly, UK investors and entrepreneurs in the second largest VC industry in the world have 
also benefited directly from purposeful and sustained intervention by the British government 
(Murray, 2007). The public administrations of both countries have seen the provision of risk 
capital for innovative young firms via the agency of profits seeking, private organizations as 
being important and, on occasions, too important to leave to the vagaries of the capital market. 
 
Advocates of state intervention can and do argue the need for public support in order to catalyze 
the emergence of a new industry. The citing of market failures as a justification for the state’s 
active intervention is often but not always credible. Yet, the harsh reality remains that the 
emergence of an active and viable early-stage ‘classic’ VC industry seems to be the exception 
rather than the rule among the developed economies of the world. This emergence process is not 
trivial nor has it found to be easily emulated. Even a nascent industry has lots of ‘moving parts’ 
and it is embedded in complex market and social processes including simultaneity requirements 
(Gilson, 2003), diffusion of the VC model (Rogers, 2003), cyclicality (Gompers and Lerner, 
2005), and the need for co-production between government investors and fund managers 
(Lingelbach, Gilbert, and Murray, 2008). 
 
We also share Pettigrew’s (2008) concern that government often focuses too much on policy 
goals and too little on the process by which policy outcomes are realized. Government support 
for VC is an example of a process of change. Yet, both government and academia have, until 
recently, given too little thought to what kind of process VC emergence might be and what are 
the implications for better policy. Instead, reflecting the dominance of economics in VC research, 
bureaucrats and academics alike have focused their attention on getting the market to work 
efficiently. While this focus may be necessary, it does not seem to be sufficient especially given 
the slow pace at which VC as an asset class has grown and internationalized in comparison to 
other financial innovations of a similar vintage. 
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A process-oriented research agenda in VC might seek to answer the following general questions: 
 
• What type of process is VC emergence?  
• What are the constituent processes of VC emergence?  
• How has the process of VC emergence varied by country and over time?  
• What are the policy implications of the different ways in which VC has emerged?  
• In what ways can government policy accelerate or retard emergence? 
 
Thus, there are several preconditions that appear to have to be met before the state can hope to 
intervene positively in a nascent or immature market. It must have the resources (including 
capital, information and technical knowledge) in order that it is able to analyze and negotiate a 
resolution of present weaknesses in supply and demand. Its intervention must also demonstrably 
support private market interests in order to realize the necessary actions to improve the 
effectiveness of the market. 
 
Above all, the state must communicate, and be prepared to justify publicly, the logic of its actions 
to its commercial partners. It is in its inability to formulate of a consistent, evidence based policy, 
- including the consequent choices for prescriptive action - that the state is frequently most 
culpable. As we have tried to demonstrate with our ‘twelve meditations’ an efficient market is a 
hard and implacable task master. For a government to become involved as a co-producer with 
private agents in the provision of risk capital services, it must be as informed and as professional 
as its commercial peers. Such skills are delegated to others by public servants at their peril. The 
state’s social goals can only be reached by first achieving its partners’ commercial objectives.  
 
Early-stage venture capital activity remains one of the most intellectually and practicably 
demanding areas of investment finance. Many governments are novitiates in these activities and 
presently remain bereft of enlightenment. The Buddhist master will remind his students regularly 
that at the centre of the eight-spoked ‘wheel of life’ or Dharmachakra, lie three symbolic 
creatures. These are the pig, the snake and the cockerel. This last symbol specifically exists to 
impress Buddha’s followers of the evil to mankind of ignorance. We would issue a similar 
reminder to policy makers. 
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Figure 1: Generic Public-Private ’Hybrid’ Early-Stage Venture Capital Fund Structure 
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Table 1. Examples of Profit Distribution Structures in Government Supported ‘Hybrid’ VC 
Funds 
 
 
 
Source: Jääskeläinen, Maula & Murray, 2007 
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